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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of different measurements of 
corruption and inequality on environmental regulation. For this reason, two 
different models were used, one without corruption and one with corruption. 
These two theoretical models were tested using an augmented Environmental 
Kuznets Curve in a cross-state panel dataset. 
 
The relationship between economic growth and environmental quality has been 
studied from different views. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis states that pollution level increase when a country is developing and 
begin to degrease when income rising pass beyond a turning point. This has 
been studied by Grossman and Krueger (1992), who came up with the inverted-
U curve relationship between per capita income and pollution. The latter was 
restated by Grossman and Krueger in 1995, when they explored that it arises in 
a more complex set of relationships that have not yet been identified. Other 
points of view noticed by Selden and Song (1994), Agras and Chapman (1998) 
and Hilton and Levinson (1998). 
 
On the one hand, the empirical evidence of the EKC hypothesis usually 
concerns a limited number of air pollutants and some water pollutants which in 
general have only local effects. There are many pollutants for which evidence 
are not available. Moreover, there is a large number of empirical studies that 
have documented the existence of EKCs for specific pollutants such as sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NO2) and suspended particulate matter (SPM). In 
particular, the basic models estimated in the literature are linear polynomial 
models that include quadratic and cubic terms of per capita income as 
explanatory variables or log linear polynomial models that include log quadratic 
and log cubic terms of per capita income. One variable that is usually omitted in 
the EKC relationship is the energy price that has been studied by Brown et al 
(1996). 
 
Another element we can use to evaluate the EKC is the international trade. The 
most frequently used trade variable is the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to income. This variable has been used by Mycoff and Roop (1994). 
Additional explanatory variables are investment shares, electricity tariffs, civil 
liberties, energy price, industrial price, population, land, rents, competition, 
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natural resources, income inequality, democracy, poverty, education and 
corruption. Nevertheless, most of the studies reach the same conclusion, per 
capita income has the most significant effect on environmental. 
 
This study will examine the effect of corruption on environmental quality. 
Corruption is concindered in the literature as affecting the total productivity of a 
country and furthermore the government’s concern and reaction towards 
environmental quality (Chimely and Braden, Lopez and Mitra (2000)). EKC 
evidence suggests the corruption is a significant cause of environmental 
problems (exp in the forestry and the marine sector) in countries with higher per 
capita income. The effect of corruption on the environmental standards has 
been analyzed by Lopez and Mitra (2000), they have found that corruption is not 
likely to preclude the existence of EKC, under the cooperative (Nash) and the 
non-cooperative (Stackelberg) assumptions. Moreover, they show that the 
turning point of EKC at income and pollution was over the social optimum, 
Damania (1999), Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), Damania, Fredriksson and 
List (2003) and Pellegrini (2006). 
 
The main aim of this study is to examine the interaction between corruption, per 
capita income and inequality, and to focus on the impact of the above 
mentioned variables on environmental regulation. In order to satisfy the aim of 
this research, this study was based on a recent paper of Barrett (1994) which 
shows that if firms are not mobile, jurisdictions still are motivated to use 
environmental policy a strategic way in order to increase the profit of the 
national firms in an international duopoly. A same approach was also followed 
by Spenser and Brander (1983). Moreover, two basic choice models were 
developed in which environmental regulation is determined endogenously and 
the agents’ income heterogenous. These models are an extended approach of 
EKC. The utility gained by the agents depends on profits and environmental 
quality, which is measured by environmental regulation as a proxy for 
emissions. The main difference of these models is the presence or the absence 
of the variable “corruption”. 
 
The first model laid one without corruption variable and in this model the 
regulation is determined by a majority vote. In this situation an increase in 
income will be followed by an increase in the environmental standards. This 
because a high level of inequality implies agents is much less considered about 
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firms profits and the result is an increase in environmental standards. This 
follows easily on median voter models will make use of the environmental 
regulator strategically in order to increase firms profits the reason is simple the 
utility gained from a cleaner environment will be a major factor in the decision  
that will be made. 
 
The second model includes the “corruption” variable in which the environmental 
standard is chosen by a corrupt bureaucrat. The main goal is to achieve higher 
profits, so lower environmental standards equal higher profits. In this situation 
an increase in income inequality reduces the “free rider” problem and the 
environmental standards. 
 
To investigate the empirical content of those two models we use data on 
environmental regulation, corruption, per capita income, inequality and 
population were used. Firstly, an econometric analysis shows the effect of 
inequality on the environmental regulation and secondly the impact of corruption 
on the environmental regulation. To do so, we make use of two different panel 
data techniques. The predictions of both models are confirmed for per capita 
NO2 and CO2 emissions using fixed effect estimations. For per capita SO2 the 
predictions are confirmed only for the height adjustment of EKC, using fixed 
effect estimations. Using the dynamic estimator of Arellano-Bond the prediction 
can be confirmed only for per capita CO2 emissions and not for of the models 
that have been estimated. For the other two emissions the predictions can be 
confirmed only for the height adjustment of EKC. 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the literature 
overview. Section 3 presents the specification of the models. Section 4 presents 
the data gathered and Section 5 the methodology. Section 6 shows the 
empirical results and Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
In this section, we give an overview of the empirical methods used in estimation 
of the relationship between per capita income and pollution across countries 
and we focus to the econometric analysis used in every instance. 
 
2.1 ECONOMIC BACKROUND  
The relationship between per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and a level 
of pollutants is usually referred to on The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), 
Moomaw (1998). In particular, the EKC describes the relationship between per 
capita and indicators of environmental degradation. At low level of development, 
the levels of pollutants rise  after increases in per capita income and in high 
level of development, the levels of pollutant degreases with increases in per 
capita income, too. These results give us the inverted U-shaped curve relating 
economic growth with environmental quality, hypotheses of Kuznets (1995). The 
EKC hypothesis was merged in work by Grossman and Krueger’s (1991). 
Kuznets (1995) also showed that the relationship between per capita income 
and income inequality shows an inverted U-shaped curve. In order to interpret 
this, he assumed that when the per capita income increases, income inequality 
also increases at the begging and then starts declining after a turning point. To 
be more specific, the distribution of income becomes more unequal in early 
stages of income growth and then the distribution of income becomes more 
equal as economic growth continues. In order to support this, Kuznets used data 
for three industrial countries: United States, Germany and England. 
 
There are several empirical works and many explanations about the inverted U-
shaped relationship in the literature. A report by Word Bank (1992) explains that 
the inverted U-shaped curve exists because of positive income elasticity for 
environmental quality. This means that when per capita income raises the 
demand for cleaner environment rises too. 
 
Panayotou (2003) suggests that there are three rationales for this inverted U-
shape. The first is that the turning point for pollution results in communities 
which place grate value on the environment to be cleaner and the governments 
are trying to influence this, with industrial and non-industrial measures. The 
second rational is that, pollution increases at the first steps of the industrial 
procedure and then after the production’s advance, industries will gain 
University of Macedonia 8 ©Christina Milka 
prominence causing the reduction of pollution. The third rationale is that when a 
country begins industrialization the scale effect will take place and that means 
an increase in pollution levels. Furthermore, firms switching to less polluting 
industries, results in composition effect, which levels the rate of pollution and 
leads firms to invest in pollution abatement equipment which reduces pollution. 
From the above mentioned rationales Panayotou (2003) gains out to the last 
one as the most significant. 
 
Copeland and Taylor (2003) reach the conclusion that there are at least four 
possible explanations. The most important is threshold effects in abatement that 
delay the onset of policy and income growth gives stronger income driven policy 
changes, structural changes towards industries and increasing returns to 
abatement that decrease the cost of pollution control. 
 
Moreover, Dinda (2004) considers the following factors: income elasticity of the 
environmental quality demand, scale, composition and technique effects, 
international trade, foreign direct investments, race to bottom hypothesis, 
international assistance, globalization, role of prices, market mechanism, role of 
economic agents, transition to market economy, regulations, information 
accessibility, a change from insufficient to sufficient investment in abatement 
activity, property rights. 
 
Lieb (2003) identifies the following factors that could explain the EKC shape: 
Substitution between pollutants, demand for environmental quality, returns to 
scale in abatement, technological progress, structural change, migration of dirty 
industries, shocks, income distributions, irreversibility’s. As we can see, many 
factors are common between Lieb (2003) and Dinda (2004)ofhem the most 
important to be: scale, compositions and technique effects and demand for 
environmental quality. 
 
Several indicators have been proposed to measure the environmental quality of 
the environmental degradation (Cialani 2007). Some of them are: carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, suspended particulate 
matter, lead, smog, chlorofluorocarbons, sewage, biological oxygen demand 
and some other chemicals released directly into the atmosphere, rivers or 
oceans. But there is little evidence that EKC holds for all these different 
indicators. 
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In their survey Friedl and Getzner (2003) report four types of indicators to 
measure the environmental quality: emissions per capita, emissions per gross 
domestic output or gross domestic product, ambient levels of pollutions and total 
emissions. Carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita are the most 
frequently used indicators in cross-country studies. 
 
Kelly (2003) examine the relationship between economic growth and 
environment using a stock externality model on EKC and shows that when 
income raises over the growth path both the marginal effect and the marginal 
cost of pollution control rise and that the emission-income curve has a negative 
effect. Also, they examine how the relationship between income and 
environment reacts according to their different measures of environment. 
 
Having increased information about ecological problems, the regulation is 
usually introduced, which forces the economy to make a transition to cleaner 
production processes. That is the explanation given by Smulders and 
Bretdchger (2000) about the EKC. Brock and Taylor (2004) developed the 
Green Solow model which is a combination of EKC and the Solow model. The 
Green Solow model is an augmented model with an abatement technology and 
shows that the curve is a result of the interplay between technological progress, 
convergence properties of neoclassical model and natural rate of regeneration.  
The technological progress can also be found in the Kindergarten Rule model of 
Brock and Taylor (2003). The Kindergarten rule indicates implementation of zero 
emission technologies in finite time or asymptotically. Thus, this model is a new 
prediction path of environmental quality to pollutant characteristics. The model 
is based on the role of technological progress to determine the diminishing 
returns to capital formation and to the abatement, with main purpose to improve 
the environment situation.  The authors found that when the demand for a clean 
environment rises income does not follow a specific path. More specifically, the 
differences in geography, resource endowments or institutions have impact on 
productivity levels across countries, which lead to the Environmental Catch-Up 
hypothesis. This means that a poor country has worse environmental quality 
than a wealthy country even though they had the same initial levels of 
environmental quality. The authors found the uncover relationship between 
income and pollution like EKC, but essentially their results are different from the 
standard EKC. Therefore, economies can cause transitions to activate 
abatement at different income and have different pollution levels. 
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Also, Lieb (2004) in his model uses stock and flow pollutants. The flow pollutant 
causes immediate damages and the stock pollutant causes future damages. 
Lied obtained different results, such as the fact that the flow pollutant exists in 
low level of income and the stock pollutant exists in high level of income. 
Therefore he found different income levels at the turning point for different 
economies. 
 
Chimely and Braden (2005) tried to find out how differences in total factor 
productivity (such as cultural values, corruption, violence, sabotage relative 
power of legal unions etc.) affect the quality of the environment. They develop a 
theoretical model where different total factor productivities produce a U-shape 
relationship between environment and income in cross-section countries, even 
though there is a monotonic dynamic path of environment across countries in its 
steady state. They also show that when the total factor productivity increases 
the environmental quality is better. 
 
In developing countries the corruption and lobbying are very important for the 
governments’ social welfare consideration. Lopes and Mitra (2000) suggests 
that government institutions in developing countries are more corrupted than in 
developed countries. They examine the impact of corruption and rent-seeking 
behavior by the government in relation to environmental quality and growth. 
They examine cases of cooperative and non-cooperative interaction between 
the government and private firms. They showed that, in both cases corruption 
induces the existence of an inverted U-shape EKC. In their model, high level of 
corruption indicates that the deviation from the social optimum is higher. 
 
Barreto (2000) in his paper used a simple neoclassical model where corruption 
is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private 
agent and suggests that if a paying bribe is acceptable by a firm, then the firm 
will pay a bribe. Also, he claims that corruption always has implication for 
income redistribution. Moreover, corrupt governments in environment with low 
economic growth usually display levels of corruption that persist over time. 
Mauro (2002) said that corruption is fount to lower investments and to reduce 
economic growth. Additionally, countries which are wealthy tent to have lower 
degree of corruption. 
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Leitao (2010) examined the impact of corruption in the relationship between 
sulfur emissions and income, with different degrees of corruptions and different 
levels of development. He found that a country with high degree of corruption 
has high per capita income, uses different income-pollution paths across 
countries due to corruption. The author used nonlinear transformations of 
nonstationary regressions in panel data estimation. He confirmed the existence 
of an inverted U-shape relationship between per capita sulfur emissions and 
income. 
 
He, Makdissi and Wodon (2007) in their work, elaborate two public choice 
models to analyze the impact of corruption and inequality on environmental 
regulation. In the first model without the corruption variable, regulation is 
determined by majority vote, and leads to the result that higher inequality gives 
better environmental quality. In the second model in which corruption variable is 
included, the environmental standard is chosen by a corrupt bureaucrat, and 
higher degree of corruptions leads to decrease the quality of the environment. 
The above mentioned models where tested using a cross-country panel dataset. 
The authors confirmed the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship for 
both sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions, for the nitrogen dioxide 
emissions and they found the height adjustment of EKC but they did not 
foundthe inverted U-shape. 
 
Monotonic and non-monotonic curves represent the relationship between 
income and pollution. Monotonic curves can be either income decrease with 
pollution decease or increase. Non-monotonic curves can be either inverted U-
shaped or N-shaped curves. In this case, there are more complex patterns. The 
different patterns discovered in empirical research depended on the types of 
pollutants used and the models that have been investigated for their estimation. 
Four different theoretical arguments for an inverted U-shape curve for emissions 
have been represented by Selden and Song (1994), which are: positive income 
elasticities for environmental quality structural changes in production and 
consumption, increasing information on environmental consequences of 
economic activities, international trade in combination with open political 
systems. Pezzey (1989) and Opschoor (1990) have insisted that inverted U-
shape relationships are not significant in the long run. They suggested N-shape 
curve relationships between income and pollutants. 
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2.2 ECONOMETRIC BACKROUND  
Stern (2004) argues that the criticism for the econometric aspect of the EKC 
falls into four categories: heteroskedasticity, omitted variables bias, 
cointegration and simultaneity. He presents that many surveys in EKC have an 
econometric misspecification. Lieb (2003) for the same issue says that there are 
six categories: simultaneity bias, the forms of other functions, time trend, 
multicollinearities, homogeneity tests and lagged effects. He supports that 
simultaneity may impair all the results, the forms of other functions may fit better 
with the data, the time trend may cause problems, there may be problems of 
multicollinearity in the regression and homogeneity may cause problem in the 
coefficients slope in some countries. 
 
A literature review shows that in order to obtain a U-curve shape relationship 
between the pollution and per capita income its necessary to use quadratic and 
cubic per capita income terms. Aslanidis (2009) in his paper says that most the 
literature material on EKC is statistically weak with some exceptions. The 
reason for this is that there are linear polynomial models with quadratic terms of 
per capita income. Polynomial models, says Dinda (2004) are unable to provide 
the underlying causes of EKC. Simultaneity is the cause that polynomial model 
should be avoided (Hung and Shaw, 2002). This happens, because income and 
environmental quality are endogenous variables and the results are biased and 
inconsistent. 
 
Aslanidis and Xepapadeas (2006) explore the idea of regime switching as new 
mythological approach in their analysis of the relationship between income and 
emissions. Their assumption explains that when some threshold is passed, the 
economy should move smoothly to another regime, with the relationship 
between income and emissions to be different among the old and the new 
regime. They used panel data for 48 States of the USA from 1929 to 1994. 
Moreover, for their study they used sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
at state level. The idea of EKC confirmed only for sulfur dioxide emissions. 
Specifically, in their static smooth regression model, they found a robust smooth 
inverse V-shaped relationship between sulfur dioxide emissions and income. 
 
There are studies on panel data analysis of the EKC that are using random, 
fixed and pooled effects. Aslanidis (2009) claims that panel data studies is 
underlying the assumption of homogeneity of income effects between the 
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countries. This is very important because not all countries have the same 
relationship between per capita income and per capita emissions. This result is 
very important in the case of comparison between developed and developing 
countries. Grossman and Krueger (1991) first developed a study with random 
effect data across 42 countries for sulfur dioxide, 19 countries for dark matter 
and 19 countries for suspended particles. Their results for sulfur dioxide and 
dark matter follow N-shaped curve and for suspended particles followed inverted 
U-shaped EKC. 
 
Seldon and Song (2003) confirmed the traditional EKCs analysis using a panel 
data analysis with cross section for fixed and random effects. The relationship 
between GDP and environmental degradation for 149 countries from 1960 to 
1990 where tested from Shafic (1994) using panel data analysis for different 
environmental degradations. The EKC hypothesis is confirmed only for sulfur 
dioxide and SPM. Tucker (1995) confirmed the EKC hypothesis for 137 
countries for 1971 to 1992 using also a panel data analysis. Furthermore, 
Moomaw and Unruch (1997) examine the relationship between carbon dioxide 
emissions and GDP for 16 countries for the period 1950 to 1992. The results of 
this study confirm the EKC hypothesis but with an inverted V-shaped curve. 
Moreover, Lantz and Feng (2006) examine the EKC hypothesis using a five-
region panel dataset in Canada for 1970 to 2000. They use for explanatory 
variables per capita income, population and technology and for the pollutions 
indicator they use carbon dioxide. Their results show that per capita income and 
carbon dioxide emissions are not related, but when population or technology are 
included there is a U-shape relationship between per capita income and carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
 
Cole et al. (1997) use a cross-section analysis to examine the traditional EKCs 
analyses. They used data for OECD countries from 1970 to 1992. For pollution 
indicators they used sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, SPM, carbon dioxide, 
methane, municipal waste CFCs and halos. They confirm the EKC hypothesis 
only for the local air pollutants. 
 
Another way, to explore the relationship between per capita income and 
environmental quality is time series regressions. In these cases, there is often a 
problem with spurious results, because the variables are non-stationary. Also, 
the unit root tests shows that these variables are integrated, Aslanidis (2009).  
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Friedl and Getzner (2003) examine the relationship between economic 
development and carbon dioxide emission for Austria from 1960 to 1999. They 
also used for explanatory variables GDP, imports and share of the tertiary. 
There results have shown N-shaped relationship between income and pollution. 
Furthermore, Soytas et al. (2007) explored the impact of energy consumption 
and output on carbon dioxide emission in the United States for 1960 to 2004. 
Except from GDP they used labor and gross fixed capital formation as 
explanatory variables. They used a new technique known as Toda-Yamamoto to 
test the Granger causality. In their study they did not confirm the EKC 
hypothesis. Ang (2008), tested the dynamic relationships between energy 
consumption, emissions and output using cointegration and error-correction 
models for France from 1960 to 2000. Their causality results confirm the EKC 
hypothesis. Additionally, Annichiarico et all. (2009) explored the relationship 
between economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions for Italy from 1981 to 
2003. They used techniques like contegration, rolling regression and error-
correction models. They found significant results according to EKC hypothesis. 
 
Agras and Chapman (1998) analyze the dynamic approach of EKC hypothesis. 
They tried to investigate the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and 
income and also the relationship between energy and income. In their dynamic 
approach they used also as trade variables the ratio of imports and exports of 
all manufactured goods. They found that the long-run income is not the most 
relevant indicator of environmental quality and energy demand. Furthermore, 
they showed that trade in manufactures goods has an important structural effect 
on per capita energy use. 
 
In summary, the EKC literature shows that when per capita income raises then 
the different measurements of environmental quality increases at the first and 
after a turning point decreases. This is known as inverted U-shaped curve. 
Additionally, there are studies that have shown that the relationship between 
corruption and environmental quality follows the same mode with the 
relationship between income and environmental degradation. 
 
As mentioned before, in this study, two models were used. One without taking 
into consideration the “corruption” indicator, which follows the classical 
approach of EKC hypothesis, and one augmented EKC model with an index of 
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corruption. This research attempts to investigate if there is an inverted U-shape 
curve between corruption and emissions. 
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3. SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
3.1 THE BASIC MODEL  
The model used in this study follows that Barrett’s duopoly framework. This 
paper starts with the assumption that every firm’s location is in a different 
country. Each firm produces yi units, where i indicate the country, emit a local 
pollutant zi. We assume that the output come out from the two firms is not 
consumed in any of the two countries. This means that the benefit from the 
decrease in the environment standard in country i is an increase in the national 
firm’s profit. The profit pii for the firm in country i is given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2, ,i i i i i i ir y y c y e y zp = - -  (1) 
 
Here, the instrumental variables represent the firm’s revenue in production cost 
and also its environmental costs. We assume that: rji<0, cji>0, eji≤0 and ezyi≤0. 
The county i is populated with ni agents who differ only by their income, which 
depends on their share of national firm. The share of agent k in the national 
firm’s capital is denoted by ψki. The preferences of the agents are represented 
by this utility function:  
 
 ( ) ( ),i i i i i ik ku z zp y p j= -  (2) 
 
where φ´(•)>0 and φ´´(•)>0. 
 
This game has two stages. The first stage represents the selection of the 
environmental standard. There are two possibilities for the determination of this 
standard, namely a major vote and a standard chosen by a bureaucrat who may 
be corrupted by the firm’s owners. The second stage is the stage where the 
firms choose their output. We have to find a backward solution in this game, so 
we first solve the second stage. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by the 
solution of: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2max , , 1, 2i ii i i i iy r y y c y e y z for i- - =  (3) 
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We subscript i as a partial derivative to yi, subscript ii as a second order partial 
derivative and subscript ij as a cross partial derivative, the first and second 
order conditions are: 
 
 0 1, 2i i ii y yr c e for i- - = =  (4) 
 
 0 1, 2i i iii yy yyr c e for i- - < =  (5) 
 
If we want to have a stable equilibrium, we assume that riji<0 and that pi111pi222-
pi121pi212>0. 
 
3.2  ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION WITHOUT CORRUPTION 
At the first stage of the game, we suppose that the environmental standard is 
fixed by the vote of the majority. We assume that each of the agents, who ones 
one or more interests in the national firm, has a motivation to lower 
environmental standard in towards to rise profits. Accordingly, the voters use 
environmental standard as a strategic variable. While making their choice, each 
of the agents acknowledges the reaction of the voter in the other country. The 
agent k chooses the environmental standard zik in country i by the solution of: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 2max , ,i
k
i i i i
k k kz
y y z zy p j-  (6) 
 
Subject to: 0, 0i i i i i ii y y j y yr c e r c e- - = - - =  
 
The maximization of the behavior of the agents involves: 
 
 0
i j i
i i i i
k i j z zi i i
y y y e
z y z
y p p j
é ù¶ ¶ ¶
+ - - =ê ú¶ ¶ ¶ë û
 (7) 
 
The maximization of the profit implies piιι=0.In this section, we can use the 
median voter theorem which says that the Condorcet winner of the vote of the 
majority in this framework gives the choice of the median voter Mi. So, the 
environmental standard is given by: 
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 0
i i
i i i
Mi j z zi i
y y e
y z
y p j
é ù¶ ¶
- - =ê ú¶ ¶ë û
 (8) 
 
In this situation, we can show that the first stage of the game is synonymous to 
a situation where the median voters in every country choose the environmental 
standards by assuming the Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the second stage of the 
game. We assume that each of the agents, who ones one or more interests in 
the national firm has the same result of the game is synonymous to Barret 
(1994) the optimal level of pollution at the national level. 
 
If we want to have a stable equilibrium we must anticipate that: 
 
 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 0
i i i i
Mi Mi Mi Mi
i i i
u u u u
y z y z z y
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
- >
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
 (9) 
 
And also that: 
 
 
2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 0
j j j j j ji i i
Mj Mj Mj Mj Mj MjMi Mi Mi
i i i i j j i i j
u u u u u uu u u
y y z z y y y y y z y y z
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶¶ ¶ ¶
+ - >
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
 (10) 
 
The Nash equilibrium of the game (z1, z2, y1, y2) is defined by relationships (4) 
and (7) for i=1, 2. 
 
Analysis of equation (7) reports that the median voter’s interest of firm’s profit 
correlated negative with the environmental standard. 
 
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION WITH CORRUPT 
BUREAUCRATS 
In this section, we make the assumption that the environmental standard in 
every country is chosen by a bureaucrat who may be corrupted. When there is 
no corruption, the bureaucrat chose the level of the emissions in every country 
according to the results of the majority vote. When there is corruption, we 
suppose that an agent may pay a bride of B=biΔi to the bureaucrat in order to 
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incite him to set a lower level of environmental standard. The price per unit of 
lower regulation is bi and Δι deputizes the difference between the real level of 
regulation and the level of without corruption bureaucrat would expect to 
choose. 
 
We assume that the firms are not able to pay brides. Also, we assume, as in 
Damania (2002), that there is a probability θi that a well executed audit will be 
done, driving to a sanction for the bureaucrat and Si(Δι) is a money-metric of the 
disutility of the sanction imposed, with Si´(•)>0 and Si´´ (•)≥0. Furthermore, we 
suppose that the bureaucrat is not risk averse, so that the bureaucrat can 
maximize the expected income and w is the income of the bureaucrat without 
corruption. The expected outcome from the corruption for the bureaucrat with 
corruption is: 
 
 ( )i i ii iEGC w b S wq= + D - D -  (11) 
 
The maximization of the behavior of the bureaucrat is: 
 ( )i ii iS bq ¢ D =  (12) 
 
This means that if the marginal increase in expected disutility is lower than the 
marginal price of bride the bureaucrat receives, the bureaucrat increases the 
emissions level. Also, if the probability of detection decreases the level of 
emissions will be higher. Consequently, we expect to find a positive correlation 
between the emissions level and the corruption level and a negative correlation 
between the environmental regulation level and the level of corruption. 
 
Solving the above relationship for Δi, we have a function Δsi(bi) that it is a supply 
function of emissions, the emissions is an input of the firm in our model. The 
agent’s objective function is: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 2 ˆ ˆmax , ,i
k
i i i i i i i i
k k k ky y z z by p j
D
+ D - + D - D  (13) 
 
Subject to: 0, 0i i i i i ii y y j y yr c e r c e- - = - - = The maximization of the agent 
and profit maximization of the firm shows: 
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 (14) 
 
In this case, the level of corruption can be a public good for the agents of the 
firms. Thus, the agents can wait for other shareholders to finance the corrupted 
bureaucrat. Consequently the level of corruption will be defined by the demand 
of the emissions or the lower regulations of the richest agent: 
 
 max 0
j i
i i i i
j z zi i
y y e b
y z
y p j
é ù¶ ¶
- - - =ê ú¶ ¶ë û
 (15) 
 
From the above relationship a function Δdi(bi : ψmaxi) that it is a demand function 
for emissions which is increasing in ψmaxi. We suppose that the bureaucrat and 
the richest agent are price receivers so that the determination of the emission is 
shown by Δdi(bi : ψmaxi)= Δsi(bi). Also, we assume that the richest agent is still 
engaged in a strategic game. 
 
Conclusive, the impact of income inequality is uncertain. 
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4. DATA 
In this section, an unbalanced panel data on environmental emission, per capita 
income, income inequality and corruption of 51 States of America during 1983-
2010 is used to test the predictions of this studies model. According to the 
literature, there are only two cross-country data series of the measurement of 
environmental policy stringency. Considering that the judgment on the quality of 
the subjective environmental regulation strictness index is based frequently on 
whether they can predict the actual pollution level in every country, we are going 
to estimate our models for a numbers of air pollution indicators. 
 
Sulfur emissions (SO2) data set, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and carbon dioxide 
(CO2), are used taken from National Priorities Project Federal Priorities 
Database, which includes all the States of America from 1990 though 2007. 
Emissions are measured in million Metric Tons of Electric Power Industry 
Emissions.Similarly, total carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion 
are the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions within a state. To be more 
specific ithis study makes use of per capita emissions, which are calculates as 
emissions/annual population. In this case, there are per capita sulfur emissions 
(so2a), per capita nitrogen dioxide (no2a) and per capita carbon dioxide (co2a). 
All of these dependent variables are measured in tons/person. 
 
The sulfur emission is among the most commonly used indicators in air pollution 
and it has several effects on natural environment and human health. The 
pollutants with inverted U-shaped curves do not involve international 
externalities. Therefore, the country that emits the pollutant suffers the damage 
and has the incentive to reduce emissions. To the contrary, carbon dioxide 
involves international externalities and it is related to the use of energy. as a 
result, the relationship between carbon dioxide emissions and economic growth 
has useful implications for environmental policies.  
 
For the independent variables, land variable from Wikipedia measured in 
squared kilometers (km2) for all the States of America was used. Annual 
population data is taken from Bureau Economic Analysis. Annual population is 
expressed in thousands inhabitants. For income inequality the study uses Gini 
coefficient panel data for the States of America from State-level Gini 
Coefficients calculated by Census Bureau for 1980 to 1994. The income data is 
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taken from Bureau Economic Analysis for 1980 to 2004 and it is the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by State measured in millions of current dollars. Also, 
the variable population density was used which equals to the annual 
population/land and measured in person/ km2. 
 
The index of corruption is provided by the department of justice and to be more 
specific from official corruption by tracfed. Corruption is explained as the 
reception of payment for an illegal act or enriching oneself from the public 
purse. This study uses the variable official corruption total as a sum of fed law 
enforcement, fed procurement, fed program, fed other, local official corruption 
and unspecified official corruption. The measurements of convictions of the 
official corruption total are taken place in this study. The index ranges from 0 to 
108. States that have corruption close to 0 means that they have low corruption. 
 
In literature close to our choice for corruption, Jie He, Paul Makdissi and 
Quendin Wodon (2007) used as an index of corruption the data selected by 
Transparency International which covers different aspects of corruption such as 
the frequency of bride’s paid, total value of brides paid and the damage to 
private business caused by corruption.  Also, Leitao (2010) used the index of 
corruption provided by the International Country Risk Guide which has also 
been used by Damania, Fredriksson and List (2003) and Fredriksson and 
Syensson (2003). This kind of corruption is based on measures to which “high 
government officials are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government” or to which “illegal payments are generally expected throughout 
lower levels of government”. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
In order to find out the impact of corruption and the impact of inequality on the 
environmental regulation an “augmented Environmental Kuznets Curve model” 
was used. According to the literature the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis states that pollution level increase when a country is developing and 
begin to degrease when income rising pass beyond a turning point. This has 
been explored since Grossman and Krueger (1992), finding of an inverted-U 
curve relationship between per capita income and pollution, and restated by 
them in 1995. 
 
For each of the emissions and for each of the corruption index, the following 
estimations were used: 
 
(1) Environmental Kuznets Curve model: 
 
2 3
1 2 3 4it i it it it it itE a Y a Y a Y a Zg e= + + + + +  (16) 
 
(2) Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with inequality: 
 
 
2 3
1 2 3 4 1it i it it it it it itE a Y a Y a Y a Z GINIg b e= + + + + + +  (17) 
 
(3) Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with corruption index: 
 
 
2 3
1 2 3 4 1 1
2 3
2 1 3 1
it i it it it it it
it it it
E a Y a Y a Y a Z corrutpion
corrutpion corrutpion
g b
b b e
-
- -
= + + + + +
+ + +  (18) 
 
(4) Environmental Kuznets Curve model slope-augmented with inequality and 
corruption index: 
 
 
2 3
1 2 3 4 1 1 1
2 3
2 1 3 1
it i it it it it it it
it it it
E a Y a Y a Y a Z GINI corrutpion
corrutpion corrutpion
g b d
d d e
-
- -
= + + + + + +
+ + +  (19) 
 
(5) Environmental Kuznets Curve model slope-augmented with inequality and 
corruption index: 
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2 3
1 2 3 4 1
2
2 1 3 1
3
4 1
it i it it it it it
it it it it
it it it
E a Y a Y a Y a Z GINI
GINI corrutpion GINI corrutpion
GINI corrutpion
g b
b b
b e
- -
-
= + + + + +
+ ´ + ´
+ ´ +
 (20) 
 
(6) Environmental Kuznets Curve model with inequality, income and corruption 
index: 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
2 3
1 2 3 4
2
1 1 2 1
3
3 1
it i it it it it
i it it i it it
i it it it
E a Y a Y a Y a Z
GINI corruption Y GINI corruption Y
GINI corruption Y
g
d d
d e
- -
-
= + + + + +
+ ´ ´ + ´ ´
+ ´ ´ +
(21) 
 
Where the subscript i denotes country (state) and the subscript t denotes year. 
The first relationship denotes the Environmental Kuznets Curve model where 
the emissions indicator model (Eit) is a function of per capita income, in this 
research annual GDP per capita (Yit) and some other indicators (Zit). In literature 
we have seen that if we want to obtain a U-curve shape relationship between 
the pollutions and per capita income we have to use quadratic and cubic per 
capita income terms. 
 
The second relationship is the same with the first relationship with an 
augmented term of inequality the index GINIit. We assume that the GINIit, 
coefficient according to the model to be negative, because it shows a decrease 
in pollution when then inequality increases. 
 
The third equation is Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with 
corruption index. To follow the inverted U-curve shape we use quadratic and 
cubic terms of index of corruption. In every case we use corruption index we use 
it with one lag, because we assume that previous period corruption affects the 
quality of the environment now. According to the theory we expect a positive 
coefficient, to show that when corruption increases, the emissions increase. The 
next equation is the same equation added with index GINIit, with negative 
coefficient. 
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The other equation is Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with 
inequality and corruption index in the same with the second with a new term 
which is the multiplication between the index of corruption and the inequality. To 
follow the inverted U-curve shape we use quadratic and cubic terms of the index 
of corruption. According to the theory we expect that the GINIit, coefficient 
according to the model to be negative and the coefficient of the multiplication to 
be positive. That means, when we have an increase in corruption and in 
inequality we have an increase in emissions. 
 
The next relationship has only the term which is the multiplication between the 
index of corruption and the inequality. We use only this term to investigate if 
corruption and inequality directly affect the pollution and the per capita income. 
In this situation we expect a negative coefficient. 
 
At the last relationship we use term which is the multiplication between income, 
index of corruption and inequality. In this case we expect multiplication to have 
positive coefficient. In every multiplication we use quadratic and cubic terms of 
the index of corruption to investigate the inverted U-shape affect. 
 
Another approach to estimate the impact of corruption and inequality on the 
environmental regulation is the use Dynamic equations. To be more specific, we 
have taken following estimations: 
 
(7) Dynamic Environmental Kuznets Curve model: 
 
 2 30 1 1 2 3 4 1 1it i it it it it it it itE E a Y a Y a Y a Z Zg q q e- -= + + + + + + +  (22) 
 
(8) Dynamic  Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with inequality: 
 
  
2 3
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 1
1
it i it it it it it it
it it
E E a Y a Y a Y a Z Z
GINI
g q q
b e
- -= + + + + + +
+ +
 (23) 
 
(9) Dynamic Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with inequality 
and corruption index: 
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2 3
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2 3
2 1 3 1 4 1
it i it it it it it it
it it it it
E E a Y a Y a Y a Z Z
corruption corruption corruption
g q q
q q q e
- -
- - -
= + + + + + +
+ + + +
 (24) 
 
(10) Dynamic Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with inequality 
and corruption index: 
 
 
2 3
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1
2 3
2 1 3 1 4 1
it i it it it it it it it
it it it it
E E a Y a Y a Y a Z Z GINI
corruption corruption corruption
g q q b
q q q e
- -
- - -
= + + + + + + +
+ + + +
 (25) 
 
(11) Dynamic  Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented with inequality 
and corruption index: 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
2 3
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 1 5
2
2 31 1
3
4 1
it i it it it it it it it
it it
itit
E E a Y a Y a Y a Z Z a GINI
GINI corruption GINI corruption
GINI corruption
g q q
q q
q e
- -
- -
-
= + + + + + + +
+ ´ + ´
+ ´ +
 (26) 
 
(12) Dynamic Environmental Kuznets Curve model augmented inequality, 
corruption and income: 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
2 3
0 1 1 2 3 4 1 1
2
2 31 1
3
4 1
it i it it it it it it
it it
itit
E E a Y a Y a Y a Z Z
GINI corruption Y GINI corruption Y
GINI corruption Y
g q q
q q
q e
- -
- -
-
= + + + + + +
+ ´ ´ + ´ ´
+ ´ ´ +
 (27) 
 
The main difference between dynamic and static equations is the use of the term that 
denotes the emissions with one lag and all the multiplications with corruption with 
one lag. To estimate all of the above equations, we use panel data techniques. Panel 
data is a dataset in which the behavior of the entities is observed across time. The 
first technique we use is Fixed Effects. 
 
Fixed Effects analyze the impact of variable that vary over time. Fixed Effects explore 
the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within the entity. Its entity 
has its own individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor 
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variable. When using Fixed Effects we assume that something within the individual 
may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and we need to control for this. 
This is the rationale behind the assumption of the correlation between entity’s error 
term and predictor variables. Fixed Effects remove the effect of those time-invariant 
characteristics from the predictor variables so we can assess the predictors’ net 
effect. 
 
Another important assumption of the Fixes effects model is that those time-invariant 
characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlates with other 
individual characteristics. Each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term and 
the constant should not be correlated with the others. One side effect of the features 
of Fixed Effects is that they cannot be used to investigate time-invariant caused of 
the dependent variables. Technically, time invariant characteristics of the individuals 
are perfectly collinear with the entity dummies. Substantively, Fixed Effects models 
are designed to study the causes of changes within an entity. A time invariant 
characteristic cannot cause such a change, because it is constant for each entity. 
 
The equation for Fixed Effects models becomes: 
 
 1it it i itY X ab e= + +  (28) 
 
Where 
· αi (i=1…n) is the unknown intercept for each entity 
· Yit is the dependent variable where, i=entity and t=time 
· Xit is one independent variable  
· Β1 is the coefficient for the independent variable  
· eit  is the error term 
 
The xtscc procedure in Stata is the technique that has been used to estimate 
the Fixed Effects. The produces Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for 
coefficients estimated by pooled OLS/WLS or fixed-effects (within) regression. 
Depvar is the dependent variable and varlist is an (optional) list of explanatory 
variables. The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated 
up to some lag, and possibly correlated between the groups (panels). These 
standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence when the time dimension becomes large. However, because this 
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nonparametric technique of estimating standard errors does not place any 
restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels, the size of the 
cross-sectional dimension in finite samples does not constitute a constraint on 
feasibility - even if the number of panels is much larger than T.  Nevertheless, 
because the estimator is based on an asymptotic theory one should be 
somewhat cautious with applying this estimator to panel datasets with a large 
number of groups that have only a short number of observations. This 
implementation of Driscoll and Kraay's covariance estimator, works for both, 
balanced and unbalanced panels, respectively. Furthermore, it is capable to 
handle missing values. We use this nonparametric technique which is not 
possible to estimate random effects. 
 
The second technique we use is dynamic panel data. Consider the linear dynamic 
panel data specification given by: 
 
 
1
p
it j it j it i it
j
Y Y Xr b d e-
=
¢= + + +å  (29) 
 
First-differencing this specification eliminates the individual effect and produces 
an equation of the form: 
 
 
1
p
it j it j it it
j
Y Y Xr b e-
=
¢D = D + D + Då  (30) 
 
which may be estimated using GMM techniques. 
 
Efficient GMM estimation of this equation will typically employ a different 
number of instruments for each period, with the period-specific instruments 
corresponding to the different numbers of lagged dependent and predetermined 
variables available at a given period. Thus, along with any strictly exogenous 
variables, one may use period-specific sets of instruments corresponding to 
lagged values of the dependent and other predetermined variables. 
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Our main goal is to seek the “true” value of this parameter, θ0, or at least to find 
a reasonably close estimate.  In order to apply GMM there should exist a 
(possibly vector-valued) function g(Y,θ) such that 
 
 ( ) ( )0 0, 0tm g Yq qé ùº E =ë û  (32) 
 
where, E denotes expectation, and Yt is just a generic observation, which are all 
assumed to be i.i.d. Moreover, function m(θ) must not be equal to zero for θ ≠ 
θ0, or otherwise parameter θ will not be identified. The basic idea behind GMM 
is to replace theoretical expected value E with its empirical analog-sample 
average: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1ˆˆ , ,
T
t t
t
m g Y g Y
T
q q q
=
é ù= E ºë û å  (33) 
 
By the Law of Large Numbers, ( ) ( )mˆ mq q» for large values of T, so if we 
can find a number qˆ  such that ( )ˆˆ 0m q »  then such number will be a 
reasonably good estimate for parameter θ0. So basically all we need to do is to 
search the parameter space Θ for a number θ which would minimize the 
distance between ( )mˆ q and zero. For a vector-valued function mˆ  the notion of 
distance can be defined in many different ways, and it actually turns out that the 
obvious Euclidian norm is not the best choice. Instead a new positive semi-
definite “weighting” matrix ˆTW is often used which is used to define the norm as 
a quadratic form ˆˆ ˆ ˆTm m W m¢= . Thus, the GMM estimator can be written as: 
 
  (34) 
 
 
Under suitable conditions this estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal, 
and with right choice of weighting matrix ˆTW  asymptotically efficient. 
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Linear dynamic panel-data models include p lags of the dependent variable as 
covariates and contain unobserved panel-level effects, fixed or random. By 
construction, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the lagged 
dependent variables, making standard estimators inconsistent.  Arellano and 
Bond (1991) derived a consistent generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator for the parameters of this model. This estimator is designed for 
datasets with many panels and few periods, and it requires that there be no 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. 
 
This Arellano-Bond estimator’s methodology has the following advantages: 
· it allows to handle strictly exogenous and predetermined regressors, 
even if arbitrarily correlated with the unobserved effects. 
· it yields robust estimates with respect to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity of errors. 
· it does not require any assumption about the initial observations of the 
dependent variable. 
 
The robustness of estimators is linked to the hypothetical cointegrating relations 
between the reference variables: in particular, such estimates can be obtained 
whether the cointegrating relation expressed by our particular model is 
significant (this implies a stationary error) or not (in this case the error must be 
integrated). 
 
Robust statistics seeks to provide methods that emulate popular statistical 
methods, but which are not unduly affected by outliers or other small departures 
from model assumptions. In statistics, classical methods rely heavily on 
assumptions which are often not met in practice. In particular, it is often 
assumed that the data residuals are normally distributed, at least approximately, 
or that the central limit theorem can be relied on to produce normally distributed 
estimates. In order to quantify the robustness of a method, it is necessary to 
define some measures of robustness. Robust parametric statistics tends to rely 
on replacing the normal distribution in classical methods with the t-distribution 
with low degrees of freedom or with a mixture of two or more distributions. 
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We use robust standard errors which specify that the resulting standard errors 
are consistent with panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in one-
step estimation. 
 
The xtabond procedure in Stata automatically performs two of the validation 
tests defined by Arellano and Bond, the Sargan specification test and the lack of 
auto-correlation test. In particular, the first is based upon the assumption of lack 
of serial correlation (of the differenced error Δuit). The second test, used to test 
lack of correlation of second order, provides a fundamental check for the 
consistency of estimators. 
 
The Sargan test has a null hypothesis of “the instruments as a group are 
exogenous”. Therefore, the higher the p-value of the Sargan statistic is the 
better. In robust estimation stata reports the Hansen J statistic instead of the 
Sargan with the same null hypothesis. The Arellano Bond test for 
autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the 
differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) process in first differences usually 
rejects the null hypothesis. 
 
In a GMM context, when there are more moment conditions than parameters to 
be estimated, a chi-square test can be used to test the over-identifying 
restrictions. The test statistic can be called the J statistic. In more detail: Say 
there are q moment conditions and p parameters to be estimated. Let the 
weighting matrix be the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix. Let T be 
the sample size. Then T times the minimized value of the objective function 
(TJT(?T)) is asymptoticaly distributed with a chi-square distribution with (q-p) 
degrees of freedom. 
 
When the number of moment conditions is greater than the dimension of the 
parameter vector θ, the model is said to be over-identified. Over-identification 
alows us to check whether the model's moment conditions match the data wel 
or not. 
 
Conceptualy we can check whether m(θ) is suficiently close to zero to suggest 
that the model fits the data wel. The GMM method has then replaced the 
problem of solving the equation m(θ)=0, which chooses θ to match the 
restrictions exactly, by a minimization calculation. The minimization can always 
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be conducted even when no θ0 exists such that m(θ0) = 0. This is what J-test 
does. The J-test is also caled a test for over-identifying restrictions. 
 
Formaly we consider two hypotheses: 
· ( )0 0: 0H m q =  (the model is “valid”), and 
 
· ( )1 : 0,H m q q¹ " ÎQ (the model is “invalid”; the data do not 
come close to meeting the restrictions) 
 
Under hypothesis H0, the folowing so-caled J-statistic is asymptoticaly chi-
squared with k–l degrees of freedom. Define J to be: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 2
1 1
1 1ˆ ˆˆ, ,
T T
d
t T t k l
t t
J T g Y W g Y x
T T
q q -
= =
¢æ ö æ ö
º ¾¾®ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
å å  (35) 
 
 under H0, where ˆq  is the GMM estimator of the parameter θ0, k is the number 
of moment conditions (dimension of vector g), and l is the number of estimated 
parameters (dimension of vector θ). Matrix ˆTW  must converge in probability to 
Ω − 1, the eficient weighting matrix (note that previously we only required that W 
be proportional to Ω − 1 for estimator to be eficient; however in order to conduct 
the J-test W must be exactly equal to Ω − 1, not simply proportional). 
 
Under the alternative hypothesis H1, the J-statistic is asymptoticaly unbounded: 
 
pJ ¾¾® ¥ under H1 
 
To conduct the test we compute the value of J from the data. It is a nonnegative 
number. We compare it with the 0.95 quantile of the x2k-l distribution: 
 
· H0 is rejected at 95% confidence level if 
2
0.95
k lxJ q ->  
 
· H0 cannot be rejected at 95% confidence level if 
2
0.95
k lxJ q -<
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Time dummies have been included in every estimation model and in every technique 
that has been used. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables and Figures are located in the Annex. Tables 1-3 present the fixed efect 
estimation results for the polutions indicators. The columns titles (1)-(5) and (8) 
report the estimation results based on the six EKC models proposed above. 
 
According to the EKC literature there is a significant inverted U-shape form 
correlation between GDP and per capita CO2 and NO2 emissions. For SO2 
emissions we can see opposite significant coeficients with the literature. The 
estimated coeficients associated to population density have the expected 
results only for CO2 emissions. For SO2 and NO2 the coeficients for the 
population density did not have the expected significance. 
 
The inclusion of the variable GINI into the traditional EKC model, through linear 
participation in models (2), (4) and (5), multiplied with index of corruption in 
models (5) and (6) and multiplied with the index of corruption and per capita 
income in models (7) and (8) does not seems to afect the results of EKC. For 
per capita CO2 emissions we obtain the expected significant negative 
coeficients for the variable GINI in models (2), (4) and (5). These results 
confirm the theoretical approach that has been discussed before in our first 
theoretical model. For per capita SO2 and NO2 emissions we obtain significant 
positive coeficients for the variable GINI in the same models. 
 
The inclusion of the multiplicative term between GINI and the index of 
corruption, with the corruption index appearing in level, quadratic and cubic 
forms in model (5) tests the prediction of our second theoretical model. The 
results for per capita CO2 and NO2 emissions are not significant, but for per 
capita SO2 emissions the results show statisticaly significant coeficients and 
indicated that the relationship between polution and GINI does depend on the 
actual value of the index of corruption. In this point, the states have been 
organized into three diferent groups according to their corruption level: low 
corruption states, mean corruption states and high corruption states. Now the 
original multiplicative term between GINI and the index of corruption becomes 
the multiplication between GINI and the three dummy variables that indicate 
low, mean and high corruption states. This is the description of model (6). The 
results show significant and diferent coeficients only for the multiplication of 
GINI with the dummy which represents the low corruption level in states for per 
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capita CO2 and NO2 emissions, and for per capita SO2 emissions there are 
statisticaly significant coeficients for the three diferent multiplications. As GINI 
is multiplied in this model by three dummies that indicate whether or not a state 
belongs to low, mean or high corruption group, single GINI term cannot be 
included at the same time. 
 
The inclusion of the multiplicative term between GINI, the index of corruption 
and per capita income with the corruption index appearing in level, quadratic 
and cubic forms in model (8), also tests prediction of our second theoretical 
model. The results for per capita CO2 emissions are not significant, but for per 
capita NO2 and SO2 emissions the results show statisticaly significant 
coeficients and indicated that the relationship between polution and GINI does 
depend on the actual value of the index of corruption and the actual value of per 
capita income. In this point, the original multiplicative term between GINI, the 
index of corruption and per capita income becomes the multiplication between 
GINI the three dummy variables that indicate low, mean and high corruption 
states and per capita income. This is the description of model (7). The results 
show significant and diferent coeficients only for the multiplication of GINI with 
the dummy which represents the low corruption level in states for per capita CO2 
and NO2 emissions, and for per capita SO2 emissions there are statisticaly 
significant coeficients for the three diferent multiplications, which are the same 
with the results of model (6). Also, in this model the single GINI term cannot be 
included at the same time. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the corruption index appearing in level, quadratic 
and cubic forms in model (3) tests the prediction of our second theoretical 
model. The estimation results for al three polution indicators show statisticaly 
significant coeficients. It can be obtained that for per capita SO2 and NO2 
emissions the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship according to the 
coeficients. In model (4) there is corruption index appearing in level, quadratic 
and cubic forms and GINI together. In this case, the estimation results for al 
three polution indicators be evidence for statisticaly significant coeficients. 
That means that the co-existence of inequality and corruption wil reduce SO2 
and NO2 emissions but the opposite result can be found for the CO2 emissions. 
 
Corresponding results for model (8) for al three polution cases are ilustrated 
graphicaly in Figure 1-3. Firstly the simple EKC is estimated (the blue line) 
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purged of the height-adjustment efect from GINI and corruption index in al the 
panels. The use of three diferent values of GINI: Low (25th percentile value of 
the sample), Mean (50th percentile value of the sample) and High (75th 
percentile value of the sample), help us to ilustrate the height-reduction impact 
of GINI on EKC. Comparison with the three panels shows that the height-
reduction efect of GINI on EKC increases with the GINI index. Also, in each 
panel there is a suggestion of the height-adjusted EKC caused by the same 
inequality level for the three diferent state groups of corruption level: Low (25th 
percentile value of the sample), Mean (50th percentile value of the sample) and 
High (75th percentile value of the sample). The three panels of per capita SO2 
and NO2 emissions reveal the same results between the group diferences, but 
for per capita CO2 emissions there is a great diference between the group of 
high level of GINI among the other two groups. In the cases of per capita SO2 
and NO2 emissions, it can be obtained, the theoretical prediction confirmation 
that the height-adjusted ECKs of the country group having the lowest corruption 
level are situated at the lowest position, for per capita CO2 emissions the 
country group having the lowest corruption is situated at the highest position. 
This can be explained by the fact that CO2 is a global polution, trade-of 
between the negative damage sufered by people and the benefit obtained by 
the poluter is thus much more dificult to capture than in the local polution 
cases of the other emissions. The mean corruption group for the three 
emissions is always between the other two levels, except for per capita CO2 
emissions for high level of GINI that the diference between the diferent levels 
of corruption cannot be obtained. 
 
Moreover, Tables 4-6 present the dynamic estimation results using one step 
Arelano-Bond estimator for the polutions indicators. According to the EKC 
literature there is a significant inverted U-shape form correlation between GDP 
and per capita CO2 emissions. For SO2 and NO2 emissions we cannot see 
significant coeficients. The estimated coeficients associated to population 
density have the expected results only for CO2 emissions. For SO2 and NO2 the 
coeficients for the population density did not have the expected significance. 
Also, for the emissions dependent variable it can be obtained that for per capita 
SO2 and NO2 al estimations for one lag emission are significant, the estimations 
for one lag per capita CO2 emissions are not al significant. 
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For per capita CO2 emissions we obtain the expected significant negative 
coeficients for the independent variable GINI in models (2) and (5). These 
results confirm the theoretical approach that has been discussed before in our 
first theoretical model. For the other two emissions there are positive significant 
coeficients for the variable GINI in models (2) and (5). For model (4) there are 
no significant results for the three emissions. In model (5) for per capita CO2 
emissions the multiplicative term between GINI and the index of corruption, with 
the corruption index appearing in level, quadratic and cubic forms with one lag 
are not significant. For the other two emissions the results are significant with 
the expected coeficients. The inclusion of multiplication between GINI and the 
three dummy variables that indicate low, mean and high corruption states with 
one lag, shown at model (6), for per capita CO2 there are no significant results. 
For the other two emissions there negative significant results only for the 
interaction with the low level of corruption. In model (7) it can be obtained the 
same results with model (6) for per capita NO2 and SO2 emissions. For per 
capita CO2 there is a negative significant coeficient for the multiplication of 
GINI, GDP and the mean level of corruption. In model (8) it can be taken the 
same results with model (5). For model models (6)-(8) the single GINI term 
cannot be included at the same time with the other indicators. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the corruption index appearing in level, quadratic 
and cubic forms with one lag in model (3) tests the prediction of our second 
theoretical model. For per capita NO2 and SO2 emissions there are significant 
results, but for CO2 there are no significant results.  In model (4) there is 
corruption index appearing in level, quadratic and cubic forms with one lag and 
GINI together. In this case, the estimation results for al three polution 
indicators are the same with model (3). That means that the co-existence of 
inequality and corruption wil reduce SO2 and NO2 emissions but the opposite 
result can be obtained for the CO2 emissions. 
 
Corresponding results for model (8) for al three polution cases are ilustrated 
graphicaly in Figure 4-6 for Arelano-Bond estimations. Firstly the simple EKC is 
estimated (the blue line) purged of the height-adjustment efect from GINI and 
corruption index in al the panels. The way the panels are made is the same with 
the panels of the fixed efect estimations. The three panels of per capita SO2 
and NO2 emissions reveal the same results between the group diferences, but 
for per capita CO2 emissions there is a great diference between the group of 
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high level of GINI among the other two groups.  In the cases of per capita SO2 
emissions it can be obtained the theoretical prediction confirmation that the 
height-adjusted ECKs of the country group having the lowest corruption level 
are situated at the lowest position, for per capita CO2 and NO2 emissions the 
country group having the lowest corruption, the mean corruption and the high 
corruption are not situated clearly. 
 
In al of the diagrams it can be obtained that the line for the emissions, without 
corruption or inequality has no linear representation and the line that describes 
the emission with corruption and inequality in diferent groups has a linear 
representation. This can be explained by the fact that the coeficients of the 
simple EKC are smaler than the coeficients in the augmented EKC with the 
multiplication of corruption and inequality. 
 
Corresponding results for models (2)-(4) for al three polution cases are 
ilustrated graphicaly in Figure 7 for fixed efect estimations. In these figures, 
there are represented the relationship between GDP and emissions without 
interaction terms of corruptions and inequality. The main idea is to find out if 
there is an existence of ECK in those three models, which difer to the input of 
independent variables, as it had represented in the theoretical approach before. 
For al models we can see the existence of EKC accordingly with the shape of 
the lines. In the figure in the top there are the results for per capita CO2 
emissions. Model (4) which is the model in which is included the independent 
variables that describe corruption index and inequality is placed in the lowest 
point. That may happen because of the existence of these variables that reduce 
the efect of GDP on the level of emissions. Model (3) is in the middle of the 
representation of the three models and has the same slope movements with 
model (4). In this case, we can explain that the existence of corruption in this 
model is the main indicator that decreases the impact of GDP on the 
environmental emissions. For model (2), which is on the top at the 
representation of this diagram, we can also observe the existence of EKC 
shape. The results for per capita SO2 and NO2 are represented to the next 
figures for the same models. As we can see there is the existence of an inverted 
U-shape relationship according to the figures. 
 
In Figure 8 there is the graphical ilustration for models (2)-(4) for the 
relationship between GDP and per capita emissions estimates with Arelano-
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Bond technique. It is obvious to understand that there is a cubic relationship 
between GDP and the three emissions. For the figure that represents the results 
for SO2 it can be obtained that it folows the same way with the CO2 estimated 
with fixed efects. 
 
Corresponding results for models (3)-(4) for al three polution cases are 
ilustrated graphicaly in Figure 9 for fixed efect estimations. In these figures, 
there are represented the relationship between corruption and emissions. The 
main idea is to find out if there is an existence of ECK in those three models. 
For al models we can see that the EKC hypothesis is confirmed accordingly 
with the shape of the lines for the three per capita emissions. The same results 
can be obtained in Figure 10, which is the graphical ilustration for models (3)-
(4) for the relationship between corruption and per capita emissions estimates 
with Arelano-Bond technique. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we aim to analyze the efect of corruption and inequality on 
environmental emissions. For that reason two theoretical modes (public choice 
models) are examined. The first model is the model without corruption and the 
second model is the model with corruption. In the case of the first model the 
environmental regulation is determined by a majority vote, where higher level of 
inequality leads to beter environmental standards. In the model with corruption 
the environmental standard is chosen by a corrupt bureaucrat, where higher 
level of corruption wil increase the level of emissions, because wil reduce the 
quality of environmental regulation. 
 
The models mentioned above, were tested using a cross-state panel dataset 
with two diferent techniques, in order to capture the potential adjustment in both 
height and curvature of augmented EKC that can be caused by inequality and 
corruption of each state. The empirical results of this study did not seem to 
support the EKC hypothesis for al the estimated models. The predictions of 
both models are confirmed for per capita NO2 and CO2 emissions using fixed 
efect estimations. That means that the inverted-U Shape hypothesis of the EKC 
is confirmed. For per capita SO2 the predictions are confirmed only for the 
height adjustment of EKC. Using the dynamic estimator of Arelano-Bond the 
prediction can be confirmed only for per capita CO2 emissions and not for of the 
models that have been estimated. For the other two emissions the predictions 
can be confirmed only for the height adjustment of EKC. For models (2)-(4) we 
have shown graphicaly the existence of the EKC hypothesis, for static and 
dynamic estimations, between GDP and per capita emissions. Also, the EKC 
hypothesis is confirmed in the relationship between corruption and per capita 
income. 
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ANNEX 
1. TABLES 
 
Table 1. Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p) – Fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a 
gdp 0.0809*** 0.0773
***
 0.0404
*
 0.00223 0.0769
***
 0.0806
***
 0.0801
***
 0.0805
***
 
 (31.88) (13.43) (2.57) (0.12) (13.19) (23.34) (21.76) (21.91) 
gdp2 -1.591*** -1.528*** -1.127*** -0.410 -1.517*** -1.596*** -1.591*** -1.592*** 
 (-30.42) (-10.73) (-4.43) (-1.30) (-10.31) (-25.42) (-23.79) (-20.12) 
gdp3 7.354*** 7.216*** 6.335*** 2.698˚ 7.189*** 7.454*** 7.432*** 7.479*** 
 (27.04) (10.24) (4.45) (1.96) (9.81) (22.39) (21.31) (18.11) 
popd -0.00321
***
 -0.00225
**
 -0.0110 -0.00644 -0.00250
**
 -0.00274
***
 -0.00274
***
 -0.00314
*
 
 (-3.95) (-3.33) (-1.29) (-1.10) (-2.81) (-3.67) (-3.78) (-2.62) 
gini  -6.460  -22.68
** -6.753    
  (-1.39)  (-2.97) (-1.39)    
lc   -0.0317* -0.0252˚     
   (-2.16) (-1.99)     
lc_2   0.000792* 0.000617˚     
   (2.17) (1.87)     
lc_3   -0.00000505* -0.00000363˚     
   (-2.19) (-1.73)     
lg_c     -0.0607    
     (-1.46)    
lg_c_2     0.00167    
     (1.55)    
lg_c_3     -0.0000105    
     (-1.48)    
lg_c_low      0.648
**
   
      (2.69)   
lg_c_mean      -0.254   
      (-0.81)   
lg_c_high      0.111   
      (0.53)   
lggdp_c_low       18.01
*
  
       (2.29)  
lggdp_c_mean       -0.279  
       (-0.03)  
lggdp_c_high       1.047  
       (0.18)  
lg_c_gdp        -0.757 
        (-0.96) 
lg_c_2_gdp        0.0183 
        (0.94) 
lg_c_3_gdp        -0.000112 
        (-0.92) 
_cons 0.849 3.999˚ 11.27
** 26.24*** 4.338* 1.064 1.218 1.234 
 (1.29) (1.91) (3.36) (4.75) (2.06) (1.13) (1.29) (1.48) 
N 918 765 639 567 761 816 816 812 
R2 0.2487 0.2494 0.2638 0.2753 0.2517 0.2649 0.2607 0.2570 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2. Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p) – Fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a 
gdp -0.000227˚ 0.000150 -0.00144*** -0.00103*** 0.000172 -0.000239˚ -0.00019 -0.000216 
 (-1.90) (1.16) (-5.32) (-3.58) (1.23) (-1.79) (-1.46) (-1.46) 
gdp2 0.00581
**
 -0.00384 0.0310
***
 0.0210
***
 -0.00421˚ 0.00536
*
 0.00456
*
 0.00467
*
 
 (3.47) (-1.73) (5.86) (3.60) (-1.83) (2.52) (2.25) (2.10) 
gdp3 -0.0261
***
 0.0189˚ -0.161
***
 -0.107
***
 0.0198˚ -0.0234
*
 -0.0205
*
 -0.0223
*
 
 (-3.53) (1.78) (-5.40) (-3.72) (1.81) (-2.40) (-2.22) (-2.26) 
popd 0.000018
*
 0.0000057 0.000146 0.0000504 0.0000164˚ 0.0000161
*
 0.000014˚ 0.0000410
**
 (2.46) (0.98) (1.42) (1.41) (1.96) (2.11) (1.81) (3.22) 
gini  0.542
***  0.378* 0.538***    
  (9.12)  (2.38) (9.40)    
lc   0.00109
***
 0.000885
**
     
   (3.53) (3.12)     
lc_2   -0.0000231
***
 -0.000021
***
     
   (-4.42) (-3.91)     
lc_3   0.00000019
***
 0.00000012
***
     
   (4.50) (3.75)     
lg_c     0.00194
**    
     (3.12)    
lg_c_2     -0.000047***    
     (-3.79)    
lg_c_3     0.00000028
***
    
     (3.87)    
lg_c_low      -0.0207
**
   
      (-3.06)   
lg_c_mean      0.0162
**   
      (2.86)   
lg_c_high      0.0106˚   
      (1.70)   
lggdp_c_low       -0.631
**
  
       (-2.99)  
lggdp_c_mean       0.339
**
  
       (2.75)  
lggdp_c_high       0.338*  
       (2.16)  
lg_c_gdp        0.0339** 
        (3.10) 
lg_c_2_gdp        -0.000677**
        (-2.91) 
lg_c_3_gdp        0.00000384
        (2.78) 
_cons 0.0493˚ -0.201*** 0.198*** 0.0106 -0.208*** 0.0625* 0.0561˚ 0.0593˚ 
 (1.79) (-5.85) (4.09) (0.12) (-6.06) (2.21) (1.94) (1.85) 
N 918 765 639 567 761 816 816 812 
R2 0.2115 0.1879 0.2692 0.2151 0.1942 0.2173 0.2044 0.1808 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3. Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p) – Fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a 
gdp 0.000133* 0.000666*** 0.000344˚ 0.00136*** 0.000654*** 0.000178* 0.000212* 0.000210** 
 (2.49) (4.40) (1.79) (4.04) (4.38) (2.31) (2.59) (3.15) 
gdp2 -0.00101 -0.0130
***
 -0.00214 -0.0238
***
 -0.0130
***
 -0.00208 -0.00258 -0.00287
*
 
 (-0.85) (-3.84) (-0.59) (-3.54) (-3.88) (-1.30) (-1.59) (-2.18) 
gdp3 0.00557 0.0630
***
 -0.0137 0.0967
**
 0.0627
***
 0.0115 0.0134˚ 0.0136˚ 
 (0.90) (3.86) (-0.41) (2.88) (3.88) (1.40) (1.66) (1.99) 
popd 0.0000059 -0.00000249 0.000388 0.000222 -0.0000015 0.0000049 0.0000044 0.0000268˚ 
 (0.56) (-0.29) (1.25) (1.23) (-0.18) (0.46) (0.44) (1.68) 
gini  0.527
***  0.834** 0.546***    
  (3.65)  (2.89) (3.78)    
lc   0.000457
**
 0.000299˚     
   (3.32) (1.96)     
lc_2   -0.0000115
**
 -0.0000085˚     
   (-3.45) (-1.87)     
lc_3   7.08e-08
**
 4.72e-08˚     
   (3.48) (1.67)     
lg_c     0.000319    
     (1.15)    
lg_c_2     -0.0000108    
     (-1.37)    
lg_c_3     6.16e-08    
     (1.18)    
lg_c_low      -0.00900
*
   
      (-2.03)   
lg_c_mean      -0.00177   
      (-0.77)   
lg_c_high      0.00158   
      (0.53)   
lggdp_c_low       -0.403
*
  
       (-2.10)  
lggdp_c_mean       -0.0852  
       (-1.06)  
lggdp_dc_high       0.143  
       (1.64)  
lg_c_gdp        0.0237** 
        (2.76) 
lg_c_2_gdp        -0.000415* 
        (-2.15) 
lg_c_3_gdp        0.0000022
* 
        (2.20) 
_cons -0.0201* -0.298*** -0.107* -0.580** -0.304*** -0.0220˚ -0.0294* -0.0291* 
 (-2.25) (-3.86) (-2.55) (-3.39) (-3.98) (-1.79) (-2.21) (-2.41) 
N 918 765 639 567 761 816 816 812 
R2 0.2304 0.2234 0.2557 0.2267 0.2098 0.2156 0.2097 0.2319 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4. Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p) – Arellano Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a co2a 
L.co2a 0.236* 0.114 0.135˚ 0.0551 0.112 0.205 0.207 0.203 
 (1.97) (0.79) (1.82) (0.52) (0.78) (1.59) (1.59) (1.54) 
gdp 0.0704
*
 0.0432 0.0792 0.0583 0.0441 0.0656
*
 0.0657
*
 0.0662
*
 
 (2.22) (1.06) (1.58) (0.92) (1.06) (2.26) (2.25) (2.29) 
gdp2 -1.702
**
 -1.048 -2.163
*
 -1.625 -1.067 -1.609
**
 -1.611
**
 -1.607
**
 
 (-2.87) (-1.50) (-2.31) (-1.39) (-1.50) (-3.08) (-3.08) (-3.14) 
gdp3 7.984
**
 4.996 11.97
**
 8.702˚ 5.108 7.583
**
 7.595
**
 7.492
**
 
 (2.91) (1.54) (2.62) (1.65) (1.55) (3.15) (3.15) (3.18) 
popd -0.00309
* -0.00153 0.00430˚ 0.000937 -0.00139 -0.00241˚ -0.00240˚ -0.00230˚ 
 (-2.27) (-0.86) (1.83) (0.39) (-0.81) (-1.79) (-1.80) (-1.74) 
gini  -38.94
*
  -32.85 -40.06
*
    
  (-2.28)  (-1.55) (-2.27)    
L.c   0.00647 0.00811     
   (0.59) (0.70)     
L.c_2   -0.000123 -0.000155     
   (-0.44) (-0.62)     
L.c_3   0.000000805 0.00000105     
   (0.46) (0.67)     
L.g_c     0.0179    
     (0.52)    
L.g_c_2     -0.000214    
     (-0.27)    
L.g_c_3     0.00000138    
     (0.28)    
L.g_c_low      -0.0597   
      (-0.23)   
L.g_c_mean      -0.253   
      (-1.47)   
L.g_c_high      -0.115   
      (-0.35)   
L.ggdp_c_low       -4.841  
       (-0.54)  
L.ggdp_c_mean       -9.403˚  
       (-1.87)  
L.ggdp_c_high       -9.287  
       (-1.05)  
L.g_c_gdp        -0.0378 
        (-0.04) 
L.g_c_2_gdp        -0.0160 
        (-0.71) 
L.g_c_3_gdp        0.000151 
        (1.07) 
_cons 3.338 20.44 4.911 21.45 23.75 2.153 2.139 4.268 
 (0.48) (1.51) (0.47) (1.04) (1.54) (0.37) (0.36) (0.59) 
N 816 663 511 450 658 714 714 709 
Arellano-bond 1 -2.589** -2.5263** -1.8073˚ -1.8734˚ -2.5238** -2.4895** -2.5075** -2.4636** 
Arellano-bond 2 1.399 1.2167 1.1491 1.1184 1.2223 1.2663 1.2682 1.2459 
Wald test 279.31* 249.12* 373.59* 163.21* 278.80* 295.90* 302.54* 274.72* 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5. Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p) – Arellano Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a so2a 
L.so2a 0.778*** 0.674*** 0.601*** 0.535*** 0.667*** 0.714*** 0.719*** 0.730*** 
 (18.90) (11.74) (10.94) (8.74) (11.51) (14.92) (14.88) (15.09) 
gdp -0.000636 -0.000670 -0.00352
*
 -0.00414
*
 -0.000684 -0.000901 -0.00091 -0.00079 
 (-0.89) (-0.86) (-2.02) (-2.20) (-0.87) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-0.93) 
gdp2 0.0130 0.0107 0.0662
*
 0.0772
*
 0.0104 0.0168 0.0169 0.0144 
 (0.96) (0.73) (2.03) (2.18) (0.71) (1.03) (1.02) (0.90) 
gdp3 -0.0567 -0.0430 -0.322
*
 -0.364
*
 -0.0411 -0.0728 -0.0731 -0.0609 
 (-0.93) (-0.64) (-2.05) (-2.18) (-0.61) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-0.84) 
popd 0.0000155 0.0000064 0.000108˚ 0.0000910
** 0.0000158 0.0000218 0.000021 0.000034 
 (0.64) (0.43) (1.75) (2.63) (1.01) (0.97) (0.91) (1.37) 
gini  0.666
*
  0.191 0.640
*
    
  (2.33)  (1.05) (2.33)    
L.c   0.000836
*
 0.000933
*
     
   (2.28) (2.27)     
L.c_2   -0.0000177
*
 -0.0000202
*
     
   (-2.26) (-2.34)     
L.c_3   0.00000011
* 0.00000012*     
   (2.24) (2.34)     
L.g_c     0.00163˚    
     (1.73)    
L.g_c_2     -0.0000368˚    
     (-1.84)    
L.g_c_3     0.00000022˚    
     (1.87)    
L.g_c_low      -0.0138
*   
      (-2.08)   
L.g_c_mean      0.0111   
      (1.12)   
L.g_c_high      0.00785   
      (1.12)   
L.ggdp_c_low       -0.495
*
  
       (-2.54)  
L.ggdp_c_mean       0.230  
       (1.02)  
L.ggdp_c_high       0.215  
       (1.21)  
L.g_c_gdp        0.0375˚ 
        (1.74) 
L.g_c_2_gdp        -0.00063˚ 
        (-1.67) 
L.g_c_3_gdp        0.0000035˚ 
        (1.59) 
_cons 0.0842 -0.135 0.539* 0.562˚ -0.142 0.142 0.144 0.122 
 (0.82) (-1.09) (2.00) (1.94) (-1.06) (1.15) (1.15) (0.98) 
N 816 663 511 450 658 714 714 709 
Arellano-bond 1 -1.7038˚ -1.6714˚ -1.4688 -1.4371 -1.6764˚ -1.7243˚ -1.6914˚ -1.6768˚ 
Arellano-bond 2 0.65938 0.65747 0.81717 0.79622 0.67267 0.70697 0.68168 0.70076 
Wald test 8587.68* 2227.86* 2537.15* 1222.85* 2360.58* 12362.25* 7774.64* 5365.62* 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6. Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p) – Arellano Bond 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a no2a 
L.no2a 0.650*** 0.543*** 0.317*** 0.162* 0.543*** 0.609*** 0.606*** 0.596*** 
 (38.91) (24.02) (4.28) (2.21) (23.64) (28.90) (28.57) (25.10) 
gdp -0.000535 -0.000336 -0.00117
**
 -0.00174
**
 -0.000329 -0.000543 -0.00053 -0.00056 
 (-1.41) (-1.06) (-2.98) (-2.98) (-1.05) (-1.21) (-1.19) (-1.21) 
gdp2 0.0132˚ 0.00995 0.0264
***
 0.0408
**
 0.00966 0.0148 0.0146 0.0144 
 (1.65) (1.32) (3.35) (2.69) (1.30) (1.45) (1.44) (1.44) 
gdp3 -0.0588 -0.0454 -0.138
***
 -0.209
*
 -0.0439 -0.0677 -0.0668 -0.0650 
 (-1.61) (-1.26) (-3.68) (-2.55) (-1.23) (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.40) 
popd 0.000022 0.0000073 -0.00000085 -0.000086 0.000012 0.000021 0.000021 0.000034
* 
 (1.57) (0.37) (-0.02) (-1.23) (0.62) (1.50) (1.50) (2.00) 
gini  0.422˚  -0.322 0.414˚    
  (1.90)  (-0.78) (1.90)    
L.c   0.000169 0.000204     
   (1.56) (1.61)     
L.c_2   -0.0000055
*
 -0.000006˚     
   (-2.02) (-1.89)     
L.c_3   3.28e-08˚ 3.98e-08˚     
   (1.92) (1.89)     
L.g_c     0.000778
*    
     (2.18)    
L.g_c_2     -0.0000189
*
    
     (-2.37)    
L.g_c_3     0.00000011
*
    
     (2.48)    
L.g_c_low      -0.00781
*   
      (-2.48)   
L.g_dc_mean      -0.00267   
      (-0.99)   
L.g_c_high      -0.00646   
      (-1.63)   
L.ggdp_c_low       -0.225
*
  
       (-1.98)  
L.ggdp_c_mean       -0.0631  
       (-0.82)  
L.ggdp_c_high       -0.0818  
       (-0.91)  
L.g_c_gdp        0.0290˚ 
        (1.74) 
L.g_c_2_gdp        -0.000463˚ 
        (-1.76) 
L.g_c_3_gdp        0.000002˚ 
        (1.72) 
_cons 0.0427 -0.125 0.147* 0.354 -0.161˚ 0.0603 0.0570 0.0285 
 (0.87) (-1.45) (2.57) (1.59) (-1.66) (1.06) (1.02) (0.52) 
N 816 663 511 450 658 714 714 709 
Arellano-bond 1 -1.3394 -1.3332 -1.6558˚ -1.8734˚ -1.334 -1.3279 -1.3274 -1.3476 
Arellano-bond 2 -0.80013 -0.90847 -0.90919 -0.94564 -0.90583 -0.90873 -0.89816 -0.78953 
Wald test 10990.01* 4886.76* 2087.38* 1016.13* 8349.50* 16557.76* 14645.03* 7093.42* 
Robust t statistics in parentheses ˚ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
University of Macedonia 50 ©Christina Milka 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
so2a 918 0.0543127 0.0687653 0.0000159 0.5539507 
co2a 918 11.51106 14.20056 0.0144516 95.69136 
no2a 918 0.0321797 0.0444372 0.0001592 0.4218313 
gdp 1326 310.0561 125.3725 146.5216 1267.849 
gdp2 1326 11.18412 14.51296 2.146858 160.744 
gdp3 1326 0.5195426 1.608161 0.0314561 20.37991 
popd 1377 121.1835 460.9313 0.2843181 3626.528 
gini 1122 0.4039153 0.031448 0.344 0.594 
c 799 13.20401 17.17862 0 108 
c_2 1165 345.4275 1100.873 0 11664 
c_3 1165 18782.16 95470.21 0 1259712 
g_c 963 4.441.873 6.950858 0 51.816 
g_c_2 963 152.6649 515.3577 0 5540.4 
g_c_3 963 8701.054 45062.12 0 598363.2 
g_c_low 1122 0.068541 0.1493235 0 0.454 
g_c_mean 1122 0.0574287 0.1416564 0 0.468 
g_c_high 1122 0.2119314 0.2052125 0 0.594 
g_c_gdp 963 0.1549278 0.3059222 0 3.205285 
g_c_2_gdp 963 5.588454 19.94464 0 216.1997 
g_c_3_gdp 963 319.3214 1687.502 0 23028.86 
ggdp_c_low 1122 0.0018594 0.0041576 0 0.0212546 
ggdp_c_mean 1122 0.0015839 0.0040184 0 0.0212702 
ggdp_c_high 1122 0.0068847 0.0089064 0 0.0675931 
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Table 8. Correlation Matrix 
 
gdp gdp2 gdp3 popd gini c c_2 c_3 g_c g_c_2 g_c_3 g_c_l g_c_m g_c_h ggdp_c_l ggdp_c_m ggdp_c_h g_c_gdp g_c_2_gdp g_c_3_gdp 
gdp 1.000                    
gdp2 0.9395 1.000                   
gdp3 0.8360 0.9728 1.000                  
popd 0.7564 0.9127 0.9596 1.000                 
gini 0.4064 0.4364 0.4272 0.4155 1.000                
c 0.2633 0.1918 0.1325 0.1728 0.4799 1.000               
c_2 0.2004 0.1333 0.0792 0.0922 0.3845 0.9154 1.000              
c_3 0.1565 0.0957 0.0475 0.0506 0.3164 0.8088 0.9718 1.000             
g_c 0.2938 0.2282 0.1698 0.2022 0.5232 0.9956 0.9248 0.8246 1.000            
g_c_2 0.2139 0.1490 0.0949 0.1038 0.4034 0.9047 0.9971 0.9754 0.9204 1.000           
g_c_3 0.1630 0.1029 0.0544 0.0551 0.3275 0.7974 0.9642 0.9975 0.8180 0.9730 1.000          
g_c_l -0.1374 -0.1046 -0.0768 -0.1286 -0.2848 -0.4249 -0.2113 -0.1400 -0.4048 -0.2041 -0.1363 1.000         
g_c_m -0.0913 -0.0719 -0.0564 -0.0581 -0.0110 -0.1655 -0.1611 -0.1196 -0.1669 -0.1572 -0.1166 -0.3316 1.000        
g_c_h 0.2975 0.2496 0.2036 0.2473 0.4582 0.7827 0.5674 0.4180 0.7746 0.5573 0.4107 -0.3456 -0.3007 1.000       
ggdp_c_l -0.0477 -0.0512 -0.0505 -0.1237 -0.2804 -0.4125 -0.2051 -0.1359 -0.3930 -0.1981 -0.1323 0.9702 -0.3219 -0.3356 1.000      
ggdp_c_m -0.0011 -0.0161 -0.0278 -0.0481 -0.0207 -0.1610 -0.1562 -0.1160 -0.1626 -0.1525 -0.1131 -0.3215 0.9677 -0.2915 -0.3121 1.000     
ggdp_c_h 0.5595 0.5750 0.5512 0.5708 0.5677 0.7062 0.5224 0.3906 0.7208 0.5244 0.3900 -0.3011 -0.2620 0.8982 -0.2924 -0.2540 1.000    
g_c_gdp 0.5305 0.5116 0.4654 0.4800 0.6067 0.9076 0.8551 0.7688 0.9331 0.8640 0.7712 -0.3423 -0.1673 0.7216 -0.3316 -0.1553 0.8173 1.000   
g_c_2_gdp 0.3185 0.2760 0.2279 0.2301 0.4574 0.8692 0.9667 0.9532 0.8981 0.9799 0.9590 -0.1906 -0.1507 0.5408 -0.1850 -0.1454 0.5793 0.9095 1.000  
g_c_3_gdp 0.2066 0.1554 0.1089 0.1060 0.3550 0.7735 0.9426 0.9822 0.8027 0.9594 0.9920 -0.1304 -0.1120 0.4007 -0.1266 -0.1085 0.4117 0.7896 0.9687 1.000 
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2. FIGURES 
Figure 1. Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Fixed efect 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 2. Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Fixed efect 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 3. Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Fixed efect 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 4. Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Arelano Bond 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 5. Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Arelano Bond 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 6. Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): Up and downward movements in EKC 
– Arelano Bond 
 Gini: Low (25 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: Medium (50 percentile value) 
 
 Gini: High (75 percentile value) 
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Figure 7. Up and downward movements in EKC for GDP – Fixed efect 
 Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): 
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Figure 8. Up and downward movements in EKC Models for GDP (2)-(4)       
– Arelano Bond 
 Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): 
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Figure 9. Up and downward movements in EKC for Corruption – Fixed efect 
 Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): 
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Figure 10. Up and downward movements in EKC Models for Corruption (2)-(4)   
- Arelano Bond 
 Per capita CO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita SO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
 Per capita NO2 emission (kg/p): 
 
